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David Colander  
  In this paper I ask a simple question: Why has the “general-to-specific” 
cointegrated VAR approach as developed in Europe had only limited success in the US as 
a tool for doing empirical macroeconomics, where what might be called a “theory comes 
first” approach dominates? The reason this paper highlights is the incompatibility of the 
European approach with the US focus on the journal publication metric for advancement. 
Specifically, the European “general-to specific” cointegrated VAR approach requires 
researcher judgment to be part of the analysis, and the US focus on a journal publication 
metric discourages such research methods. The US “theory comes first” approach fits 
much better with the journal publication metric.  
What I am arguing is that the research approach chosen is likely to reflect the 
incentives in the system. There will not necessarily be an invisible hand of truth that leads 
researchers to choose the research method that is most likely to advance understanding. 
Thus, even though the US “theory comes first” approach to macro econometrics may be a 
far worse way of understanding the macro economy, it may beat out the European 
“general-to-specific” approach because the proxy metric used to measure economist’s 
output within the US economics profession is biased against the European approach. The 
approach could develop in Europe because, until recently Europe had a different 
incentive system that gave less focus on journal publication metrics, and thus was not 
biased against research methods requiring researcher judgment as part of the analysis.  
  The paper is structured as follows. First, I consider the incentive systems in the 
US and in Europe as they have evolved historically. Second I consider the European 
specific-to-general approach to empirical macro more carefully, and contrast it with the 
US theory-comes-first approach. Third, I consider the implications of differential 
incentive systems for macroeconomics, and relate them to the different paths that Europe 
and the US have followed in macro economic and macro econometric research. I 
conclude by relating the discussion to the current “reforms” of the European incentive 
system.  
European and US Incentive Structures  
Historically, European academic researchers’ incentive systems for advancement 
tended to be more informal, political, and social than incentives facing US researchers. 
As Frey and Eichenberger (1993) point out, the differential assessment system in Europe 
and the US is explainable; in the US, there is an integrated labor market; in Europe, there 
was not, so in Europe there was less need to develop a generalized ranking system to 
compare researchers across borders. An important reason for this difference was that, 
until recently, European economics was fragmented by different languages and national 
borders, and a different promotion system that was based less on publications and more 
on subjective judgments that would develop over time. The smaller markets meant that 
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all top economists in a country would meet. They could know one another personally, 
discuss with them, and were able to come to independent judgments about each other’s 
work. Assessments based on quantitative output measures, such as publications, would 
matter, but they would be only one element in the subjective judgment. With the 
development of a common educational policy and a common language, the structure of 
European economics is now in the process of change, although the change is occurring 
slowly.  
The informal European assessments were often quite vague and idiosyncratic by 
school and country; the assessments have relied on multiple subjective elements, which 
have often been difficult to determine precisely what they were. For example, in England, 
through the 1970s, judgments about who was good rather than publications guided 
placements. This meant, that until recently, it was considered unnecessary to get a PhD in 
order to get a job, and in fact the getting of a PhD in England meant that the researcher 
was not necessarily considered good enough to be hired in the market directly. Doing 
good work, impressing higher-level professors, measures of publications and citations, 
and positively interacting with other professors were all equally important (Frey and 
Eichenberger, 1993). As Britain has integrated its profession with the US profession, that 
is no longer the case. 
While this informal assessment system has many problems, it has advantages as 
well. Specifically, judgment is given much more weight, and there is not a strong push to 
publish unless one has something to add to knowledge. The European system is now in a 
state of flux as schools adapt to the European common educational policy, but the 
changes are not as yet substantial enough to change my above characterization. (Some 
individual European schools which elsewhere I have characterized as “global” European 
economic programs, (Colander, 2008) have essentially adopted the US system, and there 
is strong pressure for others to do so as well.) 
While all the above elements are important in the US, the US incentive system gives 
greatest emphasis on quantitative measures of quality weighted journal publications and 
citations. It is this difference in emphasis that I see as having lead to the differences in US 
and European economics. Because measures of journal publication output were key 
elements of judging a researcher’s contribution, US economic researchers have focused 
their research more on “journal publishable research” than have European economic 
researchers. The measures of publication are continually evolving, as researchers learn 
how to game the existing measures. The need for publications has lead to an ever 
increasing number of “peer-reviewed” print journals (publication which count for tenure 
and promotion), even though, with the development of the web, print journals are a 
highly inefficient method of communicating research among researchers.
2 ) 
Publishability of one’s research affects all aspect of economic research in the U.S, 
including choice of research topic and research methods. It leads economists away from 
asking big questions, and instead leads them to focus on areas of research where data and 
results readily exists. Also, because papers longer than 25 journal pages are difficult to 
publish in a journal, research topics that take longer than that to explore are discouraged.  
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Addressing fundamental research questions, preparing new ground for innovative 
research, changing present paradigms requires painstaking, time-consuming research that 
requires continual interplay between empirical analysis and theory that are based on 
researcher judgment. Using journal article publications as the measure of an economist’s 
output discourages work requiring interplay between data and theory, as well as work that 
requires judgment. Alternatively put, it discourages the creation of knowledge, and 
replaces it with the creation of journal publications. 
The focus on journal publishability starts early on in US graduate school. In my 
interviews with US graduate economics students, (Colander 2006a) I found an enormous 
concern about publishability of research. Consistent with this focus, US graduate students 
have almost abandoned full-length dissertations, and replaced them with three-essay 
dissertations, so that the essays can be adapted into journal articles quickly. This was 
different in Europe, but is changing at global European schools to be identical to the US. 
I also found that students differentiate various types of papers that they write by the 
paper’s usefulness for advancement. For example, some of my interviewees distinguished 
a job market paper from a journal article paper from a dissertation essay. A major 
professor at a top university tells students to spend all their effort on developing the job 
market paper, which demonstrates one's cleverness, and one's technical prowess, and can 
be easily presented in the 45 minutes one has for a job market talk. He further advises 
them to “blow off” the other two essays in the dissertation. Graduate education in the US 
has adapted to the US assessment system by focusing on preparing graduate students to 
become article writers, rather than preparing them to become general researchers; US 
graduate schools produce highly efficient journal article writers.
3  
There are a number of interesting elements of the US publication metrics; books 
count for little in most school’s ranking system, and only peer reviewed journal articles 
count. The value of a book can actually be negative. One telling story is told by Paul 
Volker, former head of the Fed, who asked a young assistant professor to collaborate with 
him on a book. The assistant professor went to his chair an asked whether the chair 
thought it was a good idea. The chair said that one book might not hurt him; but he 
definitely should not do two.  
My purpose here is not to assess the advantages and disadvantages of the 
incentive systems in Europe or the US. Both have advantages and disadvantages, and any 
assessment system of something as esoteric as “economic research” is necessarily 
imperfect and problematic. Problems are inherent in measurement; any measure used in 
an assessment will be gamed by the participants so that it does not achieve what it was 
meant to achieve. It is an inherent problem of output measurement and assessment. As 
long as a measure is not used for assessment, it provides useful information. The more it 
is used as an assessment tool, the more it distorts choices and does not measure what it is 
supposed to measure.  
                                                 
3 Given journal publication’s importance, it is not surprising that monetary values of publications and 
citations have been calculated. Sauer (1988) considered the value of a published paper to an academic 
economist, and found that a publication in a top journal was worth an annual increase in salary of over 
$1600; Diamond (1986) found that the marginal value of a citation was between $50 and $1300. 
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Talking about distinctive European and US approaches is difficult since there is 
much overlap in both training and employment, with many European economists being 
trained in the US, and then coming back to Europe. Moreover, the US dominance in 
economics over the past 50 years has meant that the US approach to economics has 
generally been seen as the global economic approach. Despite these integrating forces, 
there are discernable differences between European and US approaches. I argue that an 
important reason for these differences is the difference in incentives in the US and 
Europe. These different incentives have had a feedback affect on the way in which US 
and European economists approach problems and on the models they use. Two 
distinctions I see are (1) Europeans tend to be more eclectic, and to have a lower ranking 
of theory models than do US economists, and (2) European economists tend to be open to 
different approaches that may not have definite answers than are US economists. These 
distinctions are consistent with those which Bob Coats (2000) and Frey and Eichenberger 
(1993) listed in their comparison of US and European economics, in his summary of a set 
of studies of economics in various European countries. 
The European vs. the US Approach to Macro  
  The difference between the dominant US and European approach to 
macroeconomics are striking and has been noted by numerous researchers such as Frey 
and Eichenberger (1993) and Coats (2000). The US approach to macro places theory first; 
the European approach is much more eclectic. This difference can be seen in recent 
theoretical developments in macro—rational expectations models, new classical 
economics, and the DSGE model; all have been primarily US phenomena.
4 Until recently, 
few European economists took an active interest in developing or exploring these highly 
theoretical models, and many considered much of this US work a fad. (Frey and 
Eichenberger, 1993) With the change in incentives in Europe, that is now changing. 
Consistent with that theory-first approach, in their empirical work US economists have 
focused recently on calibration, and have seen the goal of macro economists as 
developing a theoretical model that generates data that resembles certain moments of the 
actual data. European economists’ approach has been more eclectic; the Hendry/Johansen 
general-to-specific” cointegrated VAR approach is part of that eclecticism. 
  The US approach to macro placing theory first might be called the “simplify and 
analyze” approach. In it, researchers create an analytically solvable model that captures 
some of the key elements of the economy, and then use that model for thinking about 
macro policy. An important element of this approach is that it separates theory and 
empirical work. Campos, Eriksson and Hendry (2005) summarize this approach as being 
one that “insists on a complete theoretical model of the phenomena of interest prior to 
data analyses, leaving the empirical evidence as little more than quantitative clothing” 
(pg 1). The institutional reason this approach is favored in the US is that it takes much 
longer to develop theory that is supported by empirical evidence than it is to develop 
theory alone. By separating pure theory from empirical work, the “simplify and analyze” 
approach leads to many more publications. US economists who follow it advance; those 
who do not, fall behind or move from macro to another area. Despite the dominance of 
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this work, most European observers and many US economists, including most non-macro 
specialists, see this theoretical work in macro as intuitively unsatisfying. The US 
approach to macro is not highly considered by many non-macro specialists even in the 
US, as is evidenced by interviews with graduate students (Colander 2006a). Even some 
older top US macro economists have been highly critical of it. For example, Robert 
Solow (2006) commenting on the state of macro in the US stated “the macro community 
has perpetrated a rhetorical swindle on itself, and on its students.”  
  I describe the European approach to macro as the “complexity approach” 
(Colander, 2006) because it sees the underlying macro model as being far more 
complicated than any model that can be captured in an analytically solvable model. This 
approach has its foundation in Alfred Marshall’s view of the complexity of the economy 
and his proposition that all aspects of the economy are interconnected. Campos, Eriksson 
and Hendry capture this view nicely when they state that “the economy is a complicated, 
dynamic, nonlinear, simultaneous, high-dimensional, and evolving entity [in which] 
“social systems alter over time; laws change and technological innovations occur.” (pg. 1) 
This European approach strongly questions any simple macro model because it excludes 
aspects of the macro economy that intuitively seem highly relevant. A researcher taking 
this approach might work on theoretical models, but would believe that, given the state of 
our understanding, carrying that theoretical work as far as US economists have carried it 
is unlikely to lead to important insights. These differences are matters of degree. For 
example, most US macro economists accept that the macro economy is complex, but 
argue that light can be shed upon the macro economy by exploring much simpler 
theoretical models that are analytically solvable. This argument that exploring much 
simpler theoretical models can shed light on our understanding of the macroeconomy is 
itself an empirical claim; future historians of thought will consider whether or not it is 
correct. 
  The movement in the US to the “simplify and analyze” approach has evolved over 
the last fifty years, with the theory becoming more and more complicated and technically 
sophisticated. Back in the 1960s, before the journal publication ranking system became 
institutionalized, there was far less difference between US and European economists. But 
as those US economists who held the complexity view were weeded out through natural 
selection; (they either retired or were pushed out of macroeconomics for lack of quality-
weighted publications), the differences became greater.  
Let me now consider how these two different approaches to macro lead to 
different ways of doing macro econometrics. The European “general to specific” 
approach to macro sees the macro economy as extraordinarily complex and hence not 
susceptible to simple theories; it places empirical observation before theory. The US 
“theory comes first” approach to macro sees the economy as sufficiently simple that one 
can usefully theorize about it from first principles, and then use the results of that 
theorizing to guide empirical work. The difference between the ‘general-to-specific’ and 
the ‘theory-comes-first’ approach to empirical macro can be illustrated with the model 
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analysis in Ireland (2004) and the discussion of that paper in Juselius and Franchi 
(2007).
5  
In his study, Ireland starts with the assumption that a simple RCB model can 
explain the US experience in the post second war period. He makes his theoretical model 
more ‘flexible’ by imbedding it in a DSGE model framework in which total factor 
productivity is assumed to be a stochastic near unit root trend driving the other variables. 
The paper is impressive, and is high-level cutting edge work to almost all economists 
who do not specialize in time series econometrics, which is the large majority of them. It 
was published in a good journal. By US ‘theory comes first” macro econometric 
standards, it is a good paper; it takes the model to the data and finds the model acceptable. 
Now, the model is derived using the following assumptions: (1) All structural 
parameters are constant over time, (2) total factor productivity is driving the system, (4) 
log output, consumption, and capital are trend-stationary, (5) labor is stationary, (6) labor 
augmented technological progress follows a linear trend which influences the other 
variables identically, (7) the observable variables follow a VAR(1) process, (8) the errors 
are normally, independently and identically distributed. Each of the above assumptions is 
easily testable, but Ireland did not test them, or, rather, he did not report the test results. 
Nor did the reviewers for the journal that published the paper feel any need for the 
assumptions to be tested, because that is not the norm in the US “theory comes first 
approach”. 
By European “general to specific” standards, it is not a good paper because in this 
approach testing assumptions is absolutely required. In this vein, Juselius and Franchi 
replicated the results in Ireland and tested the above assumptions. Essentially all of them 
were rejected. Even more seriously, when the model was reformulated based on the 
general-to-specific approach, the conclusions were reversed. For example, the results 
from the properly specified model showed that it is shocks to consumption that have 
generated the long business cycles, which is exactly the opposite of what Ireland finds.  
There is nothing technically “wrong” with Ireland’s conclusions. It correctly 
states that, if all the assumptions it makes are true, then the empirical data match the 
DSGE model being tested. That qualified statement is correct. But, since none of the 
assumptions are in fact true, what does the qualified statement add to our knowledge of 
the macro economy? It is hard for an outside observer to see what it adds.  
Ireland did not test whether the basic underlying assumptions were true because 
the US incentive system and commitment to “theory comes first” macro did not guide 
him to add to knowledge, but instead guided him to get a published paper. He was 
successful; the paper was published and widely cited because it used high-level 
econometric techniques, and because it brought a DSGE model to the data.  
The European general-to-specific approach to macro econometrics does not see 
Ireland’s paper as successful because this would require that all empirical assumptions 
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(whether explicitly or implicitly made) have been tested and confirmed by the data. In the 
general-to-specific approach theory and data must match, and if they don’t match, then 
theory is either rejected as empirically relevant, or it is modified in the light of the 
information obtained from the empirical analysis. Thus, in the European approach the 
modeling process of the data provides both a critical framework and constructive insight.  
For someone worried about publications the disadvantage of the European general 
to specific approach to macro econometrics is that it is a time consuming craft that has no 
precise ling of demarcation telling us whether data match the assumptions and model. But 
a specialist knows, just as wine critic knows whether a wine is a $10 bottle of wine or a 
$100 bottle. The existing blind peer review publishing system is not set up to handle 
papers that involve craftsmanship where, without extensively redoing the entire analysis, 
one cannot tell what the contribution of the paper is, and thus one must make the 
judgment based on how much trust one puts in the researcher doing the tests. Blind peer 
review journal publication articles specifically rules out assessment of the author’s 
judgment to be a component of the review process, and thus, to be done correctly would 
require far more work than is almost even done in the real-world peer review; the 
reviewer would have to essentially rework all the analysis to determine whether the 
necessary judgments were reasonable judgments to an expert. For this reason the 
approach does not easily lead to publications. Thus, the European general to specific 
approach does not lead to as many journal article publications as does the US theory 
comes first approach.  
It is not only in DSGE macro econometrics where the push for publication has 
guided empirical research in the US more than has the search for knowledge. It is in 
almost all areas of econometrics, as has been pointed out by a number of researchers, 
starting with Ed Leamer’s “Let’s take the Con out of Econometrics”, (Leamer, 1983) and 
continuing through Larry Summers’ (1991) attack on empirical macro, and through 
Deirdre McCloskey’s attacks on statistical research placing more weight on t-statistics 
than is warranted and in mistaking statistical significance for substantive significance. 
(McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996). Much of the macro econometric work published through 
the 1980s could not even be duplicated (Dewalt et al. 1986) and the assessment that was 
held by many was that the informational content of many aspects of empirical research in 
macro was close to zero. (Cooley and Leroy 1981). Despite the concerns expressed about 
the informational content of the econometric studies, thousands of such studies were 
published in the US.  
Distinguishing the Johansen methodology from pressing the J button 
My argument that the European approach to macro econometrics is not conducive 
to success in journal and citation-ranking systems may seem somewhat strange given that 
both David Hendry and Soren Johansen, two of the leaders of the European approach do 
rather well in the journal rankings. For example, in one study, Johansen was found to be 
the most cited economist in the world. (Coupe, 2000) However, the large number of 
citations to Johansen’s work on cointegration does not reflect the adoption of his 
approach to macro econometrics, which involves placing empirical observation—the 
statistical model—first, and then using theory to guide the macro econometrician’s 
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judgment when interpreting what that model is telling him. Instead, it simply reflects 
what happens when Johansen’s cointegration techniques are used by individuals facing 
set of incentives driving them toward journal publications.  
Considering the way in which Johansen’s work has been integrated into the 
economics literature provides an example of what occurs when publications become 
almost an end in themselves. The problem is that the push for publication leads people to 
use the Johansen procedure, but not to use the Johansen methodology, which requires 
judgment and enormous amount of work pulling information out of the data. My claim is 
that while the Johansen procedure is widely used, the Johansen methodology, which is an 
embodiment of the European approach to macro, is not. The distinction between the 
method and procedure comes from a recent interview I did with Soren Johansen after 
talking about some journal articles in the US that used his procedure. In this interview he 
stated the following:  
  So there is now something called the Johansen Procedure, which 
essentially involves pressing the J-button. That is not the approach I advocate. 
What I advocate is an approach that involves a continual interaction between 
theory and data. (My emphasis) You do it by continually checking to make sure 
that the model you are using, and the assumptions that you are making, fit the data. 
Once you know the model is reasonably OK, you can go ahead and apply the 
Johansen Procedure, but the first stage—the checking of assumptions—is 
absolutely necessary. If you analyze the data using a VAR model that does not 
take account of, say, non-constant parameters or residual correlations and then 
you apply the Johansen Procedure, what you are doing is completely 
inappropriate. It may look like you are doing sophisticated econometric work, but 
what you are doing can be almost worthless.  
  When we developed this procedure we simply analyzed a statistical model 
by the general method called maximum likelihood. But before you use maximum 
likelihood, you have to be sure that you have the right statistical model. A lot of 
econometrics today is taught as cookbook techniques--you have technique 1, 
technique 2, and technique 3; econometrics is seen as applying techniques. That’s 
not the way Katarina and I approach the data. We want to choose the method that 
fits the circumstances. Our method requires a lot more careful thinking about the 
problem than usually goes into the writing of an applied paper in econometrics. 
But this has nothing to do with cointegration, of course. But it has everything to 
do with applying statistical methods to data. It is something that has to be done 
very carefully. With modern computers, it is getting easier to do, but it is also 
getting easier to do wrong.  
The distinction Johansen makes in these comments goes to the heart of the reason 
why the European approach to macro econometrics will have such a hard time integrating 
itself into the US. There is enormous pressure on US economists, whose future depends 
upon publications, (and, more and more on European economists who are at schools that 
have adopted the US ranking system) to press the “J button” or, more generally, to use 
whatever econometric technique that will come to a specific “publishable” conclusion. In 
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a publish or perish world, researchers face strong pressure to use techniques that they 
may have some acquaintance with, but that they do not fully understand. The reason why 
this misuse happens is unfortunate, but understandable. Since new econometric 
techniques are continually developing, it takes enormous effort for applied macro 
economists to keep up with the theoretical developments. When there is strong pressure 
to publish, as there is in the US, researchers have an incentive to use econometric 
techniques that they have not fully mastered, and to focus on the technique, as long at the 
resulting research can get through the reviewing process.  
The point that Johansen is making is that actually applying the Johansen method, 
or any advanced statistical method, requires high levels of judgment that have to be based 
on the researcher’s knowledge of theory, institutions, theoretical econometrics and 
applied econometrics techniques. All are intricately related in an interactive process of 
data discovery interacting with theory. Econometrics does not provide a definitive answer; 
instead it provides a tool for researchers to arrive at a reasoned judgment. Econometrics 
is a science that necessarily involves an element of craft and art. Who does it matters 
because without extensive reworking of the entire data analysis, it is hard to make a 
determination whether or not the work is solid. The articles must stand on their own, 
which leads researchers to look for definitive cut-off points and decision variables. Peer-
reviewed journal publications require econometric tests that give definitive results 
independent of the researcher doing the research. Using the Johansen Procedure does that; 
using the Johansen Method does not. Because the Johansen method requires that the 
researcher do far more work that is generally necessary to get a paper published, it is ill 
suited to an incentive structure that uses a journal publication assessment metric. That is 
the reason why I believe it has experienced a better reception in Europe, and why I 
believe it will have such a hard time being adopted in the US. 
The problem is that journal publication is a poor metric for good data analysis. If 
the goal of researchers were to understand what the data are telling you, then the using 
the Johansen methodology makes the most sense, but if the goal is to publish the results 
in a peer-reviewed journal, then using the Johansen procedure makes sense.
6
Good applied macro econometric research more often than not does not fit a 
journal article format, and there is little incentive to do good applied econometric 
research if the publication is an end in itself. Thus, while theorists such as Johansen and 
Hendry can do well in the journal publishing metric, those applied economists who want 
to follow their method, cannot.
7 True followers of the Johansen method will find it 
difficult to prosper in an environment such as the US, which is focused heavily on journal 
publication as the metric for advancement. The reason is quite simple; it takes a much 
longer time to do a paper using the Johansen Method than it does using the Johansen 
Procedure, and it is very difficult for anyone other than a specialized expert in time-series 
                                                 
6 Since there are few reviewers who fully understand the Johansen methodology, and there are many 
journals, a researcher can almost always find a journal that will accept the paper. 
7 The easiest type article to publish using the Johansen method is one showing problems with existing 
research. Unfortunately, editors discourage such papers (it does not make them look good), and such 
papers are not advancing a true understanding of the macro economy; they are simply pointing out what 
is wrong with the existing research.  
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econometrics who has extensively worked with the procedure to distinguish between the 
two. When publications become the metric for advancement, a publication version of 
Gresham’s Law applies: “bad” technique-oriented empirical research replaces “good” 
method oriented research, as those who follow the Johansen methodology do not get the 
publications needed to stay in the profession.  
One could argue that having a publication that demonstrates a poor understanding 
of an issue will hurt a person’s career, but that is seldom the case. Generally, few bother 
to actually correct a paper, since doing so will seldom lead to a publication. Each 
economist tends to focus on his or her own work. That is why Dewalt et al (1986) found 
that much of the research they considered could not even be duplicated, much less 
replicated. The reality is that having one’s results challenged generally does not hurt the 
researcher. In fact, if someone later points out that the approach they use is wrong, and 
the journal editor publishes the criticism, they get credit for a citation. Moreover, they 
can respond to the criticism, and that response can count as another peer reviewed article.  
  One’s immediate answer to the problem I am posing is that it is simply a 
statement that we need better reviewers.
8   After all, if we had expert reviewers who 
insured that all published work met the highest criteria of both theory and applied work, 
there would be no problem. Unfortunately, expert reviewers are in short supply, 
especially when new techniques are involved. One can only ask true experts to review 
papers so many times; the experts have better things to do with their time.  
Concluding discussion 
  Let me conclude with a summary of my argument. From my nonspecialist’s 
perspective, the European general-to-specific approach to macro econometrics in areas 
where replication of results and controlled experiments are generally impossible, and in 
which the system being studied is so complex that theory does not provide much 
guidance, seems to be a better way of doing macro econometrics than the US theory-
comes-first approach. The approach is not used in the US because it requires the macro 
econometrician to be a craftsman, not a technician, and thus is not consistent with the 
peer review journal publication process. It requires high levels of author judgment in 
pulling information from the data and an ability to use theory to guide that search. The 
US incentive system which focuses on blind peer review journal publication involves a 
bias against approaches requiring judgment, and thus is not a good environment for such 
work. Until recently the more eclectic European incentive system gave more weight to 
judgment and provided an environment within which this approach could develop.  
This presents a concern for me about the nature of the changes that are occurring 
in the European academic incentive system. While I agree that Europe’s more eclectic 
incentive system has been characterized by much waste and enormous inefficiency, 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, one could argue that we need a system of assessment in which doing less-than-stellar 
research has serious negative consequences. I know of no examples in economics where that has been the 
case, and I know of a number of examples where finding problems with one’s empirical research has not 
hurt the person’s career at all, (or has even helped it since they get additional citations and publications 
responding to the criticisms.) 
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(Kirman and Dahl, 1993), it is important to remember that that eclectic incentive system 
also allowed pockets of excellence to develop that did not have develop in the US. The 
European approach to macro econometrics is one of those pockets of excellence. Europe 
provides an alternative environment that is friendlier to research requiring judgment. As 
Europe moves to a common educational policy and changes its incentive system to 
further excellence in research, one can only hope that it does not eliminate the institutions 
that allows those pockets of excellence to develop in the first place. 
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